When ransomware hit the cameras
In June 2017 the WannaCry ransomware infected Victoria's fixed road-safety camera network after a maintenance contractor plugged in an infected USB stick.
| Detail | Figure |
|---|---|
| Camera devices infected | 110 (43 Redflex + 67 Jenoptik) |
| Cameras potentially exposed | up to 280 |
| Fines suspended as a precaution | ~8,000 |
| Fines withdrawn | 1,643 |
| Fines embargoed pending review | 5,500 |
Authorities said there was no evidence the ransomware had altered any fine's accuracy — the tickets were cancelled "to preserve public confidence." Which rather concedes the point: public confidence in automated fines rests on the assumption the system is clean, and that assumption had just been broken.
Sources: iTnews; Global News; Victorian Road Safety Camera Commissioner report, WannaCry malware infection (2018).
Nearly 19,000 wrong fines — in one state, in three years
- NSW, Jul 2007 – May 2010: the state refunded 18,944 inaccurate or illegally issued camera tickets worth $3.79 million, across 148 separate incidents. One location alone (King Georges Road, Beverly Hills) accounted for 5,279 tickets and ~$888,000.
- Victoria, 2004–2006: authorities secretly deactivated cameras they knew were faulty and admitted 1,130 motorists were falsely accused. The West Gate Bridge cameras were quietly disabled after 4,243 citations — the assistant commissioner: "if we can't be absolutely sure, let's not infringe."
- The impossible speed: a Victorian camera clocked a 1975 Datsun 120Y at 98 mph — a car whose top speed was about 73 mph — blamed on faulty in-ground sensors. Officials initially insisted on the fine.
Sources: NSW refunds (documents released by the then-Opposition); Victoria faulty cameras / Datsun / West Gate. Some single-outlet specifics are reported figures; treat exact totals as "as reported."
The machine is not conclusive — a court said so
In RTA of NSW v Michell (2006), the NSW Supreme Court dismissed the roads authority's appeal against an acquittal. The camera image lacked a legally required security indicator (proof the image wasn't altered), and Justice Adams held this could ground reasonable doubt even with no contrary evidence from the driver:
Computer processes "can go awry," and a "tribunal of fact is still bound … to consider the quality of that evidence." — Adams J, RTA of NSW v Michell (2006)
In other words, a camera certificate is evidence — not automatic guilt. But most people never test that, because of how the system is built (see below, and The Law).
Source: RTA v Michell (2006) NSWSC.
The AI that "sees" a phone — and sometimes a sandwich
Mobile-phone detection cameras use AI to flag drivers, with a human reviewing before a fine issues. Reported grounds for successful challenges include a phone sitting untouched, a reflection or object misread as a phone, adjusting the air vents — even a hand near the face. The vendor's "95% capture" figure is a design target, not an independently verified false-positive rate.
The transparency hole Here's what's genuinely damning: no Australian authority publishes a false-positive rate or the proportion of contested camera fines that get withdrawn. NSW even hosts a dataset on fine reviews and waivers — but the headline error rate isn't advertised. Combined with owner-onus (you're presumed liable and must actively contest), the rational move for most people is to just pay. A system that profits from people not checking its accuracy has little reason to publish it.
Sources: NSW review/waiver data — data.nsw.gov.au; AAP FactCheck (enhanced images admissible). No official false-positive rate exists in public sources — a prime FOI/GIPA target.